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LOW INCOME COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL 
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Report of a Group of Experts
PREFACE
The following report is addressed to the special problems faced by 
low-income countries in accommodating their economies to the vagaries of 
an increasingly unstable international monetary system. The lov-income 
countries share with other developing countries all the well-known weaknes­
ses characteristic of developing countries as a whole, such as vulnerability 
to business fluctuations emanating from abroad as well as to protectionist 
restrictions imposed by other countries on their export trade, the limited 
diversification of their exports, the difficulties associated with their 
position as price takers, for the most part, rather than price makers in 
world trade, the limited margin for manoeuvre afforded by inadequate reserves 
both of essential goods and of foreign currencies, and the immense problems 
of adjustment that result from the rigidities of their economies and the 
immobility of their resources. It is therefore natural that the low-income 
countries resolutely support the Blue Book on International Monetary Reform 
adopted by the Ministers of Finance of the Group of Seventy-seven at their 
meeting in Belgrade in September 19T9-
The fact that low-income countries are in most respects quite similar 
to other developing countries in their political, social and economic make-up 
does not mean that their problems and options are identical with those of 
their more advanced developing country neighbours. It has long been apparent
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that there axe differences betveen low-income countries and other developing 
countries that are of considerable importance - differences that will be 
described in some detail in the main body of this report. The significance 
of these differences was clearly recognized by the IMF when it established 
a Trust Fund and a subsidy account to assist a limited group of member 
countries - despite the Fund's well-known objections to discrimination in 
favour of particular countries within the international monetary system.
Since the early 1970s the relative position of the low-income 
countries has been sharply eroded. The relative displacement of IMF 
balacee of payments support by commercial bank lending has meant a corres­
ponding deterioration in the ability of low-income countries to achieve a 
satisfactory combination of adjustment and financing. Since most of these 
countries are not deemed creditworthy by the private b a n k s t h e  IMF is for 
them the only possible source of balance of payments financing and not merely 
the lender of last resort. Since IMF financing has been inadequate as regards 
both volume and terms, the low-income countries have been forced, under 
conditions of persistent world recession, to retrench much more drastically 
than other groups of countries, despite the fact that their low income levels 
leave them with much less margin for such retrenchment than other countries 
have.
Under current conditions, moreover, the international community is 
understandably preoccupied with the problems of large debtors that impinge 
on the financial stability of the major industrial countries and hence of 
the world as a whole. The rescue operations that have been mounted in support 
of these countries have been impressive in their promptness and scope. In 
this process, however, the fact that low-income countries are in an equally
/...
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if not more difficult position has been virtually overlooked, and for them 
no relief is in sight.
In the view of the Expert Group, it is particularly critical at 
the present time that priority attention be given to this problem which the 
international community cannot afford to neglect without running the danger 
of massive political and social upheaval in the countries concerned.
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Low income countries and the international monetary system 
Introduc tion
1. The stake of the developing countries in the international monetary 
system (IMS) - by which we mean primarily the rules, institutions, policies 
and practices regarding the adjustment and/or financing of external 
imbalances, the creation and distribution of international liquidity, and the 
determination of exchange rates - stems very largely from the vulnerability cyf 
developing economies to exogenous shocks and the difficulties these shocks 
pose for economic management generally, and the management of the payments 
position in particular. Within the broad group of developing countries there 
are sub-groups of low income and structurally disadvantaged countries for whom 
vulnerability is even greater and existing lines of recourse to the 
international monetary system for support even less adequate. This report 
relates primarily to the present position and immediate requirements of these 
economies, but does so within the context of global developing 
country/international monetary system interaction.
2. It is well to remember, in this context, that the international 
adjustment process is asymmetrical. For one thing, countries in surplus are 
under far less pressure to correct the imbalance in their payments than are 
deficit countries; the former generally enjoy ample room for accumulating 
reserves, whereas the latter face rather tight limits on how far they can draw 
on their accumulated stock of reserve assets or borrow. This asymmetry hurts 
all deficit countries, but most especially low-income countries. It is these 
countries, therefore, which bear the brunt of the failure of the international 
monetary system to provide for effective means to adjust surpluses or finance 
the corresponding deficits on a long-term basis.
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Size and source of the payments deficit of developing countries
3. Over the last few years, developing countries have faced intense and 
growing pressure on the balance of payments. The energy-importing developing 
countries suffered a deterioriation in their terms of trade of nearly 6 per 
cent per annum from 1978-1981, due to a weakening of commodity prices 
resulting from recession in developed countries and a rise in import prices.
4. The purchasing power of exports (calculated on 1978 export volume and 
1978 prices) fell by 20 per cent from 1978-1981, which represents a cumulative 
loss of over $40 billion over the period (in 1978 prices) - a figure 
corresponding to the entire capital inflow and to two-thirds of the foreign 
exchange holding-? in 1978. There can thus be little doubt that exogenous 
factors have been adversely affecting the payments position of most developing 
countries with great force, and account for the big deterioration in their 
external accounts.
5. Since external financing has not sufficed to offset the pressure, import 
growth in energy-importing developing countries has dropped to very low levels 
- 1.3 per cent in 1980 and 2.0 per cent in 1981: for many countries there has 
been a cut in the absolute level of imports. Rates of growth of gross 
domestic product have also taken a sharp cut, from 4.1 per cent in 1980 to 1.4 
per cent in 1981 and an estimated 0.5 per cent in 1982, and in many countries 
there has been a contraction of production per capita. Because these rates 
are in constant prices, they overstate growth of national purchasing power 
(including command over imports) during periods of worsening terms of trade. 
Given the terms of trade decline, the 1981 growth of real purchasing power of 
chase economies was approximately 0. In other words, not only has there been 
a loss of real income due to external factors, but a major erosion in the 
capacity of many countries to increase output pay to offset the loss.
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Low income and structurally disadvantaged countries
6. Developing countries diverge substantially in respect to their 
vulnerability to external shocks, their capacity for domestic management of 
exogenously generated instability and their effective access to the 
international monetary system for interim and long-term resources to meet 
crisis needs, including structural adjustment and enhancement of production to 
regain balance. Those countries with particularly low incomes - per capita 
and absolute - suffer from a series of interlocking structural handicaps to a 
greater degree than other developing countries. In times of extreme global 
monetary and financial stringency and uncertainty combined with sustained 
recession in the industrial countries, the number of developing countries 
suffering from extreme structural handicaps broadens. Characteristics leading 
to high levels of vulnerability, limited capacity for domestic response and 
inadequate access to international resource flows include:
(a) Low per capita income. The poorer the country the less the margin for 
cuts without massive damage to essential consumption, basic services, new 
investment to restore balance, and replacement investment to maintain existing 
capital stock and productive capacity. Cuts in the income of the absolutely 
poor threaten nutrition, health, shelter, clothing and life expectancy 
directly. Reduction in public services falls heavily on primary and adult 
education, pure water supply, agricultural extension, and preventive and 
basic curative medicine. Falls in public revenue and in surpluses of 
production enterprises prevent adequate maintenance of existing assets let 
alone new investment to alter production patterns in accordance with higher 
export generation and import saving requirements;
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(b) Low national income. Low overall national income is usually associated 
with a larger share of imports and exports in monetised G N P . It is also 
associated with a limited range of exports and limited ability to alter the 
composition of exports in response to international price fluctuations 
paralleled by heavy import dependence for essential products often including 
fuel, food and capital goods. Therefore, low national income countries are 
more susceptible to international demand fluctuations and less able to respond 
by altering export and overall production patterns than are larger economies.
(c ) The elasticity of imports and exports. Inasmuch as the pattern of home 
demand in low-income countries differs from that for internationally traded 
goods, lowering the domestic absorption of goods and services will not serve 
to expand the volume of exports to an equal degree; inflexible marketing and 
distribution arrangements, and other such factors (including transport costs) 
impeding access to foreign markets will also limit the elasticity of demand 
and supply of exports. Similarly, where the import bill is largely made up of 
essential items (such as, for example, basic foods, fuel, raw materials and 
machinery) and where capacities used in the production of non-essentials for 
the home market cannot be redeployed to substitute for imports, a compression 
of import levels, before new investment has taken place and yielded its 
results, will require a reduction in the level of output itself instead of 
merely lowering the import content of the output. The lower the elasticities 
of substitution in consumption and production, the costlier it is to correct a 
payments deficit in the short term (that is to say, without a prior increase 
in productive capacity). While low elasticities of substitution are by no 
means unique to low income countries, their impact is usually more severe for
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such economies because of the greater divergence between export and home 
demand patterns in these countries and the lower share of the more flexible 
manufacturing sector in production and in exports.
(d) Limited access to international capital markets. Countries with low per 
capita and low total GNP tend to have limited access to international 
commercial bank credit especially under those conditions of external imbalance 
crises and global uncertainty when they most urgently need such resources. In 
practice the access of the least developed countries to such credit has 
usually been negligible and at present a far broader range of low and middle 
income developing countries have no substantial access to commercial bank 
credit s .
(e) Relative systemic unimportance. Where a major developing country faces 
serious external difficulties, such as a debt crisis, the international 
community attaches high priority to devising a solution and accepts a not 
insignificant degree of bargaining leverage from the borrower because of the 
mutuality of the interests involved. In the case of low income and 
structurally disadvantaged countries, perception of mutuality of concern in 
survival is much weaker, and there is much less interest in locating financial 
resources, or in negotiating (in contrast to imposing) a package of external 
and domestic adjustment measures.
7. There are a number of other points to be made in connection with the 
above characteristics.
(a) A country's ability to cope with deteriorations in its current 
account balance is also related to its position on long-term capital account. 
In addition, the larger is the flow of aid relative to the exports of a
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country, the smaller will be the proportion by which its imports would need to 
be cut in order to compensate for a reduction in export receipts by any given 
amount. Moreover, the more a country's savings are supplemented by ODA, the 
higher will be the level of investment and hence the scope for adjusting the 
pattern of production.
(b) Also of importance, from the standpoint of payments adjustments, is 
the degree to which external assistance is fungible. To the extent that the 
aid flow is tied to specific projects, it cannot be used to pay for imports of 
essential production inputs such as fuel and raw materials; nor can it be 
redeployed to accord with a new set of priorities to which a more constrictive 
payments situation may have given rise. Rigidity in the use of aid compounds 
other structural rigidities and reduces the ability to alter overall external 
resource use patterns promptly in response to exogenous changes.
(c) It has already been pointed out that countries most prone to incur 
deficics as a result of. exogenous events are the main victims of the asymmetry 
in the positions of deficit and surplus countries. By the same token, it is 
those deficit-prone countries that are least able to cover their deficits with 
reserves and borrowing on whom the asymmetry bears down most heavily. The 
least developed countries clearly fall within this group as do all 
characterised by low per capita and national incomes. During periods of 
global economic recession and monetary stringency, the number of countries 
seriously affected broadens.
8. Developing economies as a whole are particularly vulnerable to changes in 
the international economic environment and particularly limited in their 
access to the international monetary system when the comparison is with high
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income industrial economies. However, the degree of vulnerability and of 
access (or lack thereof) is not uniform within the developing country group. 
Low income countries - both in per capita and overall GNP terms - tend to be 
more severely affected on both counts especially during crisis periods like 
that beginning in 1979. Therefore, within the overall developing country 
objective of international monetary system reform, special attention should be 
given to those measures which are particularly important to ensuring survival 
of low income economy production and consumption capacity as well as ability 
to achieve structural change during the present crisis.
9. In large part, low-income countries can and do protect themselves from 
payments deficits by accumulating foreign exchange reserves when the payments 
situation is relatively favourable, and drawing upon them to finance deficits 
in bad years. However, this does not remove the burden arising from their 
handicaps, since reserve accumulation has an opportunity cost - a high one for 
countries whose growth is, at the best of times, constricted by import 
capacity. Nor is it always feasible: exposed and vulnerable countries are
not in a position to predict with accuracy either the trend or the 
fluctuations in export earnings and import prices. In any case the volume of 
reserve levels needed to offset 50 per cent falls in the terms of trade and in 
earned import capacity (amounting to 10 to 15 per cent of pre-crisis national 
purchasing power) over 1978-81 is one implausible for any country to achieve, 
let alone a poor one. Yet those are the types of decline in import capacity 
which have confronted many low income economies. It is to be expected, 
therefore, that reserves will prove inadequate from time to time. It would, 
for example, be difficult to fault a country for not anticipating strong
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pressure on the external balance if that were the consequence of an 
exceptionally long and severe recession elsewhere, or the result of prices of 
essential imports moving upwards and staying up (or moving up further) owing 
to unpredictable events (such as war or revolution). Indeed if such 
developments occured simultaneously, reserve depletion might be unavoidable; 
nor would it be surprising to find many countries which would, in normal 
conditions, be able to tide themselves over with commercial borrowing, now 
unable to attract bank credits. In other words, low-income developing 
countries have, because of the impact of external economic forces and the 
uncertainties surrounding them, a relatively high need for reserves and, 
because of their development needs, a relatively low capacity to accumulate 
them in sufficient quantities.
10. Low— income countries lacking the commercial borrowing option are thus 
especially dependent on official payments support. The volume, terms and 
duration of access to IMF resources are issues of key importance to them. The 
policies and practices of the IMF are no less significant. For that reason, 
it is to be expected that if IMF conditionality is stringent, the impact will 
not be equal even if the conditions are equally stringent for all countries 
drawing upon the IMF. It is the countries most dependent upon it that will in 
consequence be most constricted.
11. Any improvement in the current account through adjustment of the volume 
of exports and imports involves a sacrifice (unless underutilized resources 
can be mobilized for that purpose). Adjustment of the current account can, 
however, entail additional costs if compressed into an unduly short period of 
time. These can take the form of lowered levels of capacity utilization, or 
or disruption to development programmes.
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12. The extent of the transitional costs incurred will depend critically on 
two factors: first, the size of the turnaround sought in the current account 
over any given period of time, and second, the degree to which patterns of 
consumption and production are flexible. Where internal resource mobility is 
low, swift adjustment in the external sector will result in an internal 
imbalance, with possibly severe consequences for the long term development of 
the economy.
13. Where the external imbalance is the result of a recent over-expansion of 
spending, it is to be expected that the current account will respond much more 
swiftly to disinflationary measures, and that the reduction of effective 
demand will have a smaller and more transitory effect on capacity utilization 
than where changes in the structure of production are called for. Similarly, 
where the external imbalance results from falls from previously achieved 
export volume levels (especially of manufactured goods) related to recent 
over-valuation of exchange rate, a currency devaluation can be expected to 
bring a speedier correction in the current account than where import 
replacement or export expansion requires the establishment of new lines of 
produc tion.
14. Where the external imbalance is the result of a deterioration in the 
terms of trade (or decline in capital inflows), the perceived excess of 
aggregate demand over aggregate supply corresponding to the external deficit 
is best viewed as being the consequence of a shift in the supply curve rather 
than of the demand curve. For example in a number of Sub-Saharan African 
economies and other low income countries real import volume, real produce 
prices, real wages and salaries and real government expenditure have all
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fallen in recent years in large part because of terms of trade deterioration 
of up to 50 per cent. This pattern - even if accompanied by inflation - can 
hardly be interpreted as external imbalance caused by runaway domestic 
demand. This distinction is useful not only as a diagnostic device but also 
for the prescription of policies, since it points to the need to increase the 
capital stock and to change its composition. Adjustment in the foreign 
balance is more difficult and complicated when the imbalance is in the pattern 
of supply, in particular between the foreign trade sector and the 
non-tradeables sectors, and within the foreign trade sector, rather than in 
the over-all relation of expenditure to output .
15. To the extent that capacities are not readily switchable from production 
for the home market, correcting a foreign deficit requires changes in the 
patterns of production involving expansion of capacities, i.e., new 
investment, in export and import-substituting goods. A compression of demand 
for non-tradeables is likely to increase the supply of tradeaole commodities 
only to a moderate degree, depending on the pattern of consumption and the
extent to which the two sectors compete for production inputs such as building
materials and skilled labour. Forcing the pace of adjustment between the two 
sectors is likely to result in substantial costs being incurred: it will
render idle those resources employed in the non-tradeables sector for which
the tradeables sector has and will have no productive use, as well as those
which the tradeables sector will not be able to absorb usefully until 
additional capital stock has been installed. In the short run, therefore, an 
attempt to correct a supply imbalance by cutting aggregate demand and/or bv 
switching consumption away from imports and exportables is likely to lower
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output in non-tradeables sectors without triggering a commensurate increase in 
the output of the foreign trade sector, thereby generating an unnecessary loss 
of real income.
16. The correct line of attack would be to expand productive capacity in the 
foreign trade sectors, while compressing demand for non-tradeables by no more 
than is critical from the standpoint of increasing exports. The amount of 
reduction in aggregate demand required to achieve a given reduction in 
external imbalance is often very high - especially if existing domestic market 
orientated production cannot, in practice, be switched to exports. Indeed 
such demand cuts, if concentrated on farmer incomes (directly or by cutting 
production of basic consumer manufactures), on government spending for 
maintenance of infrastructure and for basic health and education services and 
on low income urban groups (e.g. via instant abolition of food subsidies and 
minimum wage freezes), are likely to erode even export oriented production. 
They would tend to create a pseudo-equilibrium sustainable only at steadily 
falling real output, deteriorating capital stock and increasing levels of 
socio-political tension. To avert this pattern of disintegration requires 
more initial period maintenance (or augmentation) of import capacity to 
sustain or rehabilitate maintenance and capacity utilisation as well as to 
enhance export capacity directly. This, in turn, implies moderating the pace 
at which the external balance is corrected: investments will need to be
phased over a period of years, and each will take time to yield results.
Thus, the appropriate blend of adjustment and financing is likely initially to 
involve slower adjustment and greater financing when the imbalance is the 
result of deterioration in the terms of trade, than when it results from an 
over-expansion of demand.
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17. The speed of adjustment via supply enlargement will depend to an 
important degree on the rate and sectoral composition of new investment. 
Incentives of various kinds can help reallocate resources to the activities 
warranting expansion. But much less can be expected from price signals where 
the volume of new investment is low than where it is high; and demand 
reduction, inasmuch as it reduces savings, is likely to make the task of 
increasing investment more rather than less difficult. Successful adjustment 
to a deterioration in the terms of trade will therefore require not only the 
avoidance of unduly restrictive (or expansionary) policies regarding demand, 
but also a rise in the level of new investment.
18. When the capacity to save and the availability of foreign exchange have 
been impaired by a worsening of the terms of trade, it will be particularly 
difficult to increase investment solely through domestic efforts. Indeed, in 
such circumstances, a rise in the propensity to save might well result in cuts 
in output and employment, rather than a diversion of income from consumption 
to investment. An adjustment process that took this route could be expected 
to result in not only unnecessarily high losses in current income, but also 
losses in terms of future income due to failure to bring about the structural 
changes necessary to sustain growth and development. What is needed is an 
increase in the flow of external financing, in conjunction with an increase in 
domestic savings, to enable the necessary expansion of productive capacity to 
take place, and do so without disrupting the economy as a whole. Payments 
financing thus needs to be underpinned by external assistance on appropriate 
terms and conditions.
1 9. Maintenance and utilisation of existing productive capacity are critical 
m  low income countries for several reasons. First is the extreme damage done 
by reduction in already inadequate levels of personal consumption and basic
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public service availability. Second is the negative effect on structural 
adjustment of deterioration of the infrastructure resulting from extended 
payments crises. Third is the negative impact of the existence of 
underutilized productive capacity on domestic savings, investment incentives 
and overall economic policy formulation. Fourth, the falls in production - 
particularly in manufacturing - and imports frequently cause a radical erosion 
of the tax base thus causing or exacerbating recurrent budget deficits despite 
real expenditure cuts. Fifth, by reducing supplies of inputs (e.g. 
fertilizers, implements) and supporting services (e.g. transport) the cuts in 
production erode both export and domestic food production and increase losses 
prior to export or consumption - worsening both the external balance and food 
supply position. Sixth, by curtailing availability of domestically produced 
basic consumer goods - especially in rural areas — such cuts in production 
reduce incentives for producing agricultural products for sale, thus reducing, 
not increasing, supply of exportables and import substitutes. In extreme 
cases - of which at least a score now exist, mostly but not wholly in 
Sub-Saharan Africa - maintenance and capacity utilisation support is more 
critical than most new investment projects because the latter only add to 
future underutilised capacity while the former can enhance present and short 
term future supply of exportables and import substitutes as well as averting 
increases in absolute poverty, malnutrition and government deficits.
20. The preceding discussion also carries implications regarding the use of 
the exchange rate as an instrument of adjustment. Devaluation may be 
necessary to correct a divergence between domestic and foreign rates of 
inflation, and in order to guide new investment into the right sectors. But
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devaluation should not be expected to generate a quick turn-around in the 
current balance by itself (or even in combination with demand restriction), if 
export expansion and import substitution are contingent upon new investment.
In certain situations, controls and other selective measures may be more 
suitable.
21. To conclude, successful adjustment to worsened terms of trade requires an 
expansion of investment rather than a contraction of demand; otherwise the 
underlying disequilibrium will be suppressed rather than corrected, resulting 
in damage to the development process without removing the prospect of renewed 
payments pressures in the future. Adjustment through growth implies a need 
for time to make the adjustment - and hence, bridging finance - as well as 
additional capacities - and, hence, long term resources from abroad. Both 
need to be assured for a number of years ahead to allow forward planning.
22. Since the process of payments adjustment to a worsened external 
environment involves issues related to the pace and pattern of development, it 
is inappropriate to draw a tight distinction between payment support on the 
one hand, and development assistance on the other. The amount of payments 
support required, the period of time over which it will be necessary, and the 
policy measures called for will depend on the structure of the economy in 
relation to the size and origin of the payments deficit. Equally, the extent, 
form and timing of the investment resources needed will depend on the size and 
type of balance of payments adjustment appropriate to the situation.
The international response
23. The increased payments pressures on developing countries have been eased 
to some extent by the international community. However, so far the response 
has proved to be inadequate. Indeed, on the whole, it has been less positive
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Chan in Che 1974-1975 period when, as now, exCernal facCors pushed Che 
exCernal accounCs of many developing counCries inCo a large imbalance.
24. The IMF has adopCed a number of policy changes in Che pasc several years 
ChaC in principle enable ic Co provide a more significanC share of Che balance 
of payraenCs financing required by developing counCries Chan in Che pasc.
25. The SevenCh General Review of QuoCas was implemenCed aC Che end of 1980, 
which raised quocas by an average of 50 per cenC and Chereby increased 
borrowing abiliCy; and preparaCory work on Che Eighch General Review was 
iniciaced in 1980. Moreover, in AugusC 1979, Che quoCa limic for borrowing 
from Che CompensaCory Financing FaciliCy (CFF) was raised from 75 Co 100 per 
cenC, and Che annual borrowing limic of 50 per cenC of quocas was dropped. In 
1981 Che facilicy was exCended Co cover Che cosC of excesses in cereals 
imporCs above Crend averages and Che maximum drawings ouCsCanding on combined 
export shortfalls and cereals excesses raised Co 125 per cenC of quoCa. The 
most notable sCeps taken by the Fund, however, have been to raise the limit Co 
drawings under quoCa to 150 per cent a year, with a maximum limit of 450 per 
cent over a three-year period, and a maximum limit or cumulative access to 
Fund resources, net of repurchases or repayments, of 600 per cent of quoCa.
26. The Fund has also adopted a new set of guidelines on conditionality 
whereby, among other Chings, stand-by arrangements may be concluded for a 
period of up to three years in order to alleviate the effect of corrective 
measures on real incomes and to contribute to a distribution of the burden of 
adjustment within the economy that is socially and politically more 
acceptable. The guidelines also state that in assisting countries in the 
design of adjustment policies, the Fund will pay due regard to the concern of
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countries about the compatibility of stabilization policies with their 
economic priorities and their domestic, social and political objectives.
27. However, the stated modifications in Fund policies, and especially in 
actual Fund practices, have not reflected adequately the extent and gravity of 
the payments pressures upon developing countries, particularly the low income 
and structurally disadvantaged countries.
28. The enlargement of quotas has been very modest; indeed it was not enough 
to improve, other than to a very small degree, the ratio of quotas to trade, 
which is low by historical standards. The substantial increase in the 
multiple of quotas that can be drawn cannot be regarded as a satisfactory- 
alternative to quota increases inasmuch as it involves a lowering of the 
proportion of borrowing limits carrying first credit tranche conditions; if 
quotas had been increased by sixfold in place of the rise m  the multiple to 
600 per cent of quota - which would have been the normal way of proceeding - 
first-credit tranche conditionality would have applied to the equivalent of 
150 per cent of current quotas instead of 25 per cent. The increase in the 
proportion of quotas that can be drawn under the CFF must also be set against 
the modest rise in quotas. Moreover, drawings to cover cereal-related 
deficits are only marginally additional to other CFF drawings - the ceiling on 
CFF drawings has been raised from 100 per cent to 125 per cent of quota - nor 
are import price rises other than for cereals taken into account. The ratio 
of deficit developing countries IMF quotas to exports stood at 16 per cent 
over 1966-68 and declined to 6 per cent over 1979-81 while that to current 
account deficits declined from 64 per cent to 12 per cent over the same 
period. Thus the increase in CFF limits in proportion to quotas (from 50 per
ant in 1966 to 125 per cent in 1981) has not even maintained real value in
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respect to exports while in respect to current account deficits it has been 
halved. Further in 1979 the IMF altered the calculation of shortfalls from an 
arithmetic to a geometric average centered on the year in respect to which the 
CFF drawing is sought. As the IMF itself stated the result of this alteration 
was to reduce the amount of shortfall as calculated for CFF purposes. Thus, 
not only has there been no addition to low-conditionality resources comparable 
to oil facilities established in 1974 to meet the externally generated 
deficits arising from the first jump in oil prices; there has been a shift 
towards more conditional borrowing for drawing under quota. In particular,
CFF drawings have sometimes been handled together with higher credit tranche 
and EFF drawings and thus subjected to their high conditionality.
29. Moreover, the Fund has not accepted the principle that externally 
generated deficits need to be remedied differently from those resulting from 
excessive expenditure. On the whole, the Fund continues to seek to remedy 
deficits through demand reduction, and to the extent that supply is addressed, 
the focus is on the freeing of market forces rather than on increasing 
investment, still less on achieving higher utilisation or enhanced maintenance 
of existing productive capacity. Although it has for some years allowed, 
under the EFF, drawings with repayment periods of longer than the normal 3 to 
5 years, it continues to use performance criteria whose rationale stems from a 
short term and monetarist diagnosis of payments deficits rather than one based 
on structural characteristics. This approach does not provide a time frame 
adequate to achieve alterations in production structures based on selective 
increases in capacity to produce tradeables. Standby arrangements have 
continued to involve the setting of precise time-bound targets for the money
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supply and bank credit - an approach which has proved to be full of pitfalls, 
in both developing and developed countries - and this has been in large part 
responsible for the frequency with which stand-by arrangements have broken 
down, particularly since 1979.
30. These shortcomings are felt most by the low income, structurally 
disadvantaged countries since, as we have already pointed out, for them the 
Fund is the lender of first as well as last resort. The stringency of Fund 
conditionality in the past led many developing countries to avoid recourse to 
the Fund, especially since their borrowing limits were not large. However, 
payments pressures have now reached the point at which recourse to the Fund 
cannot be easily avoided: credit tranche and EFF drawing rose from $0.12 
billion in 1980 to $5.78 billion in 1981. Drastic curtailments in development 
programmes increasingly have been rendered unavoidable. In part, this is due 
to the very high incidence of breakdowns and suspensions in agreements entered 
into since 1979 as the Fund shifted towards tighter terms.
31. For the low-income countries, the paucity of action with regard to the 
terms of IMF lending is also a matter of concern. The Subsidy Account has 
received relatively modest contributions from members, and the Trust Fund 
monies - which constitute the principal resources for the Subsidy Account - 
involve no additionality: nevertheless, the users are subject to higher 
conditionality. Moreover, no subsidy account has been established for the 
Enlarged Access Facility, although the considerations justifying a subsidy in 
the case of the Supplementary Financing Facility are fully applicable to its 
successor.
32. In May 1982, the Ministers of the Group of Twenty-four "expressed serious 
concern at the hardening of the Fund conditionality and the growing number of 
inoperative programs". Almost all of the latter were occurring in low-income
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countries experiencing difficulty in meeting Fund performance requirements 
under conditions of deepening international recession affecting their export 
earnings. The Ministers "regretted the emphasis on demand management policies 
and the limited role assigned to policies to enhance supply and to address 
structural imbalances, which give Fund programs an essentially deflationary 
character that is not appropriate to the structural nature of the problems 
faced by most developing countries or to the conditions of the world 
economy". They called for a greater role for the Fund in the recycling and 
adjustment process "through appropriate conditionality".
33. Low-income developing countries have received little relief from SDR 
allocations. This may be guaged by the fact that total allocations were some 
$4 billion per annum for the third basic period (1 January 1978 - 31 December 
1981) of which energy-importing developing countries received less than ¿750 
million.
34. Long-term assistance flows have risen, but by much less than the 
financing requirements of developing countries. Some bilateral donors have 
raised their transfers significantly; however, some major developed countries 
have opted to reduce their aid appropriations. Assistance from OPEC member 
countries has continued'to increase, and the proportion of GNP accounted for 
by aid continues to stand several times higher for OPEC donor countries than 
for the developed market economies. However, since 1978, this growth has not 
been sustained. This is hardly surprising given the unsatisfactory balance of 
payments position confronting all but a handful of oil-exporting developing 
countries as of 1982.
35. The response of the multilateral institutions has been positive, but, 
again, modest in its proportions. The IBRD's capital base has been increased 
by a moderate degree. IDA, on the other hand, is making cut-backs owing to
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reductions in contributions below the levels agreed for the Sixth 
Replenishment. IDA commitments in fiscal year 1982 were ¿2.7 billion, 
substantially below the levels of the last few years, (¿2.3 billion in 1978, 
¿3.0 billion in 1979, ¿3.8 billion in 1980 and ¿3.5 billion in 1981), 
especially in real terms. IDA lending because of its low cost is particularly 
critical to low income countries, especially at a time when even 
semi-concessional rates (e.g. export credit, World Bank.) are at or above 10 
per cent, so that these reductions have a disproportionately severe impact on 
their ability to procure foreign resources at a bearable cost.
36. The Bank has adopted a policy of providing "structural adjustment loans"
- programme assistance in order to facilitate fundamental adjustments designed 
to correct an underlying payments deficit. Here again, however, there is no 
additionality of resources. This new approach can, nevertheless, benefit 
countries with structural payments deficits, since these loans are fungible, 
though conditional. It is too early to judge the Bank's new lending policy, 
but the evidence would suggest the need for a more coherent, uniform and 
stable Bank perspective on what the scope of adjustment should be. In 
particular inadequate attention appears to be being given to the need to 
sustain basic consumption and service levels and to realistic estimates of the 
time lags between approval of programmes, disbursal of funds and achievement 
of actual increases in investment and output. Further, the imposition of 
macro and sectoral policy conditionality additional to that of the IMF 
whatever its logical rationale seems likely to constrain resource allocation 
in low income countries to the point of creating a serious new set of 
semi-structural rigidities and resource utilisation inefficiencies.
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37. While the regional development banks have not been active in adjustment 
finance, bilateral donors (such as the European Community) have extended 
payments support (and food aid) in significant amounts. Such aid has however 
not always been adequately co-ordinated with national adjustment strategies, 
perhaps because long-term payments support has been generally regarded as a 
special ad hoc measure, rather than as a more general element in low income 
country programmes, at least for the duration of the present economic crisis.
38. Despite the many developments that have taken place, therefore, 
concessional and other official aid flows have been sluggish and 
overwhelmingly project-oriented, at a time when low-income countries are 
encountering great difficulty in maintaining import levels, and when the 
over-riding objective for many recipients is to maintain capacity utilization.
- 2 6 -
Recommendations
39. The Group agreed on a series of recommendations designed to assist low 
income countries in coping with their present economic crises - internal as 
well as external - and with achieving structural reduction of these imbalances 
through special measures oriented to increased investment in, and production 
of, exports and import substitutes. While these measures are equally 
applicable to the developing countries in general, they are, in the present 
context, perceived as of special relevance to the low income, structurally 
disadvantaged countries for four interconnected reasons:
(a) These groups of countries suffer from structural rigidities that 
severely constrain their ability to mobilise internal resources as a means of 
propelling their economies from the present poverty trap level;
(b) These economies are particularly dependent on access to public 
sector resource transfers because of their lack of effective access to 
commercial bank borrowing;
(c) The need for external resources - relative to required adjustment 
and to GDP - is greater for low income countries because of the relative 
openness of their economies and their lack of margins of domestic resources 
above normal minimum operating requirements; and
(d) Certain programmes e.g. compensatory finance and other special 
facilities - are relacively most important to those economies with high ratios 
of trade to GNP and volatilities of terms of trade.
40. These recommendations are intended as sui generis treatment for the 
structurally disadvantaged low income countries in their relations with the 
international monetary system. Their external imbalance crises and structural
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constraints must be alleviated now through the international financial 
system. To that end, the measures proposed are ones which could be adopted 
within the existing system without awaiting long term structural reforms.
They do not constitute an alternative to such reforms but, rather, interim 
action needed urgently to avert a series of national economic collapses 
pending world economic recovery and the negotiation of longer term structural 
reforms.
A. Recommendations relating to IMF
In relation to the IMF the Group agreed on the need for action on a 
number of issues with specific reference to additionality of resources, 
conditionality and the general operational philosophy of the Fund. These are 
intended to enable the LICs to participate more meaningfully in the 
International Monetary System. Accordingly, the Group agreed to the following 
recommendations:
1. The Eighth General Review of Quota should at least double IMF quotas. 
In view of the pressures which have arisen since the Seventh General Review of 
Quota, it is urgent to accelerate the time period for the Eighth Review. In 
setting quota levels special consideration should be given to lack of 
effective access to commercial credit sources as a factor justifying larger 
relative quota increases for low income countries.
2. The compensatory financing facility (CFI) should be untied from quota 
limitations and related to shortfall of export earnings calculated in terms of 
import purchasing power, i.e., it should compensate for loss of earned import
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capacity. Shortfalls should be calculated on an arithmetic, not a geometric, 
average thus reverting to the pre-1979 basis. 1/ Repurchase schedules should 
be linked with recovery of export earnings in terms of real import capacity. 
Provision already exists for accelerated repurchases in cases of rapid export 
recovery - a comparable set of provisions should be made for deferred 
repurchases (perhaps over years 5 to 10 following the year of drawing) in 
cases of continued real export shortfalls. The CFF should remain a low 
conditionality facility in respect to all drawings and not be repackaged with 
upper credit tranche, EFF and other high conditionality drawings and thereby 
subjected to their conditions.
3. The Extended Fund Facility (EFF) should be made more need related in 
terms of eligibility, preferrably by untying it from country quotas, but 
alternatively by more frequent use of waiver powers in respect to quota 
limits. The conditions accompanying drawings should place greater weight on 
achieving higher real output and maintenance both of real household incomes 
and of basic public service provision levels, and less on particular domestic 
policy measures chosen for use in regaining international balance. Because 
"trigger clause" targets are calculated on specific assumptions as to world 
economic variables (e.g. interest rates, export and import prices) and of 
domestic events not totally within state control (e.g. crop output, inflation 
rates), the targets should be subject to automatic adjustment on agreed 
formula bases if the actual levels of these variables diverge widely from 
those assumed at the time of programme agreement.
1/ The IMF justification for use of a geometric mean, that over 1957-78 
global trade had grown on a geometric trend, was not, in fact, the experience 
of most low^-income countries even then and does not correspond either to their 
or to global trade's evolution over 1978-1982.
- 2 9 -
4. A special window should be set up as an emergency facility with, say, 
¿2 billion a year for five years to provide additional resources to the low 
income countries facing severe adjustment problems and with inadequate access 
to financial markets. Drawings under this facility should be concessional, 
not quota-linked and should be eligible for interest rate subsidy from Subsidy 
Account resources. Drawings should carry relatively long repayment schedules 
with provision for deferral of repurchases at least 5 to 10 years following 
drawing in cases of continued real import capacity shortfalls below pre-crisis 
levels.
5. The subsidy account should be topped up to cover additional subsidy 
requirements under additional drawings resulting from proposals 1 and 3. 
Eligibility for such subsidies should be extended to include all structurally 
disadvantaged developing countries.
6. A substantial new issue of SDRs should be made over 1983-1985. SDRs 
should be linked to development finance. Allocations should be delinked from 
quotas and related to structural trade account deficits.
7. In formulating conditionality the IMF should define conditionality in 
a way more favourable to the needs of LICs. Differentiated treatment which 
recognises the differential burden of conditionality, rather than a uniform 
approach should be adopted as a more equitable way of dealing with LICs 
problems. In its operating philosophy, the IMF should take cognisance of the 
basic structural differences between the industrial countries and developing 
countries and in particular the LICs. It should recognize the dominance of 
exogenous factors in the present crisis confronting LICs. It should put the 
stress on supply extension through new investments rather than on demand
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contraction, and adopt a more flexible approach regarding particular 
adjustment measures chosen by drawing states. In this respect, it should 
recognize that forcing adjustment in the external account before adjustments 
in the productive capacity have taken place, entails severe costs in terms of 
output and employment. The IMF should, therefore, support programmes that 
involve import reductions and export expansion through the growth of supply.
B . Recommendations relating to the World Bank Group
8. The capacity of the World Bank Group to mobilize resources for 
lending to developing countries is of particular importance to the low-income 
countries. The regular lending programme of the World Bank envisages total 
lending of ¿60 billion over the 5-year period ending in fiscal year 1986, a 
figure that implies no expansion in real terms over th^ period. These plans 
should be revised so as to allow for an expansion of regular bank lending of 5 
per cent per annum in real terms over the next several years.
9. The modalities of Bank lending should be modified considerably so as 
to adapt them to the present needs of developing countries. The proportion of 
structural adjustment loans in total lending should be increased to at least 
30 per cent and the conditionality attached to the structural adjustment loans 
modified. Particular attention needs to be given to achieving a positive 
growth rate of real GDP while improving the structural balance between exports 
and imports. Such lending should widen key structural bottlenecks while 
attaining high levels of capacity utilization. It should also maintain and 
expand basic services without entailing worsened income distribution and 
without increasing the numbers suffering from absolute poverty.
10. As regards regular project lending by the World Bank, attention 
should be given to projects likely to nave a direct impact o<n the balance of 
payments. In the light of the financial difficulties currently being faced by
low— income and other developing countries, there is need to increase the 
proportion of total project costs financed by the World Bank; in particular 
there should be greater World Bank financing of local costs.
11. Because the IDA is the single largest multilateral source of 
concessional funds for structural adjustment available to structurally 
disadvantaged developing countries, it is crucial that this source of 
financing should be expanded in the years to come. The special arrangements 
for fiscal year 1984 need to be finalized in a way that maximizes IDA flows in 
that year. Negotiations on IDA-VII need to result in a substantial real 
increase in IDA resources.
C. Recommendation relating to Regional Development Banks
12. Regional Development Banks should increase both the shares of soft 
window and programme lending in their total disbursements and the real levels 
of such lending.
D . Recommendations relating to ECDC
13. Developing countries' central banks should explore the possibilities 
for increasing use of deposits with one another as a means to bolstering the 
ability of these countries, and particularly structurally disadvantaged 
developing countries, to withstand crisis-related shocks .
14. Developing countries in a position to do so should create or expand 
regional soft loan funds open to use by structurally disadvantaged developing 
countries possibly along the lines of the Nigerian fund administered by the 
African Development Bank and/or of Trinidad and Tobago in respect to CARICOM.
15. Surplus oil exporting developing countries should broaden the 
availability of loan back arrangements of a portion of the price of petroleum 
and products exports to structurally disadvantaged developing countries
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possibly along the lines of the programmes now carried out by Mexico, 
Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago and Nigeria.
16. National and multinational development institutions financed by 
oil-exporting developing countries should alter the balance of use of the 
resources available to them toward a greater proportion of balance of payments 
support soft loans and grants and toward sectoral soft loans keyed to 
supporting maintenance and capacity utilisation in key sectors to low income 
countries with particularly severe external balance problems. Such a 
reallocation to improve effectiveness of programmes in meeting low income 
economy crises through maintaining productive capacity and enhancing supply is 
particularly important now that the external balance position of most oil 
exporting countries precludes substantial increases in their volume of 
resource transfers.
E. Recommendations to bilateral sources of finance
17. The aid effort of developed donor countries should be intensified. 
Bilateral donors should seek to adapt their aid programmes to low-income 
countries to the present circumstances. Among other things, this would entail 
increasing substantially the volume of budgetary and balance of payments 
support at least for the duration of the present economic crisis.
18. The terms of industrial economy guaranteed export credits to 
structurally disadvantaged developing countries should not be hardened in 
respect to interest rates and both the maximum grace and repayment periods 
should be lengthened - say to 3 and 12 years respectively. Industrialized 
countries should take a more responsible attitude in not promoting such 
credits where they are an unsuitable source of finance (either because of the
nature of the project, or the medium term external balance prospects of the 
economy) and by acting to ease terms on outstanding credits of this type which 
are creating, or may create, debt service crises for developing countries and 
in particular structurally disadvantaged developing countries.
19. Governments should give urgent consideration to providing external 
borrowing guarantees to presently structurally disadvantaged developing 
countries for commercial borrowings, with special reference to those countries 
which have in the past had access to, and ability to service, such borrowings, 
but have temporarily been pushed into the structurally disadvantaged category 
by post 1979 external shocks.
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TABLE 1
lia In nee of Payments: Ti ratio Balance 
in Goods and Services: 1965 - 1980
1
Year
2 3 
Merchandise Trade
6 5
Balance on 
Services
6
C o l . 6 as % of 
Current GDP
7
(Col. 6 + Col. 5) 
as Z of Current 
GDP.Exports 
(T. Sh. m)
Imports 
(T. Sh. in)
Balance 
(T. Sh. in)
1965 1,675.9 1 610.0 65.9 - 1.07 -
1966 1,889.9 1,696.9 195.0 -72.9 2.77 1.73
196 7 1,796.9 1,637.6 159.0 - 2.15 i
1968 1,719.0 1,833.7 -116. 7 - -1.65 -
1969 1,756.5 1,710.1 66.6 177.3 .55 2.67
1970 1,797.2 2,276.2 -677.0 225.9 -5.21 -2.76
1971 1,913.1 2,725.6 -812.5 208.8 -8.11 -6.03
1972 2,312.7 2,882.9 -570.2 256.0 -9.99 -3.7
19 73 2,581.1 3,678.9 -897.7 190.1 -6.85 -5.6
1976 2,878.1 5,377.0 -2,698.9 .181.7 -15.6 -16.69
1975 2,766.0 5,709.6 -2,965.6 680.9 -15.69 -12.96
19 76 6,108.0 5,369.5 -1,261.5 ./ 666.6 -5.3 -3.3
1977 6,666.2 6,161.3 -1,697.1 155.7 -5.8 -5.2
1978 3,670.6 8,797.7 -5,127.1 210.1 -15.3 -16.72
1979 6,686.3 9,073.2 -6,583.9 306.0 -12.2 -11.37
1980 *
\------------
6//02.2 10,261.9 -5,559.7 156.1 -15.6 -15.1
Source: liank of lanxniiia, Economic and Operations Reports various issues, National Accounts, various
issues; Green et al (1980).
* R e v i s e d  e s t i m a t e s
T A B L E  2 !
P u b l i c  F i n a n c e / G r o s s  Domestic P r o d u c t  Ratios 1 9 6 1 - 1 9 8 0
( s t a t e d  as % of GDP) 
1960/61 1963/64 1966/67
Recurrent Revenue 13.0 3 14. 2 15. 5
Recurrent Expenditure 13.6 13.7 15. 5
Capital Expenditure 2. 6 2. 9 4.5
Total Expenditure 16. 2 16.6 20.0
1969/70 1972/73 1975/76 1977/7 8 197 8/79 1979/80
20. 1 22. 8 20.9 21.7 21.6 22.6
19.5 21. 1 19.8 19.8 26.0 27. 5
7.8 7.0 12.0 11.8 15. 1 15.8
27 .3 28.1 31.8 31.6 41.1 • 43. 3
No toa
1. Includes Debt Service in full. Technically debt redemption should not be included.
2. ‘On budget‘ items only.
3. Excludes Colonial Welfare and Development Payments.
Sources
Adapted from "Twenty Year Review" Annex Tables on Gross Domostic Product and Trends in Government Finances; 
Financial Statement and Revenue Estimates (various years); World Dunk, The Economic Development of Tanganika.
TABLE 3
Makeup of Recurro n't Revenue 1961-60 
(in Percentages)
Major Direct Taxes 
Income 
Export
19 6 0 /6 1
9 I
(2 0)
0  )
1963/64
22.5
(20)
(2.5)
1966/67
26.5
(23)
( 4)
1969/70
25.5
(2-2.5)
( 3 )
1972/73
24.5
(2 2)
(2.5)
1975/76
39-
(35)
(4)
1977/78 
36 5
(27.5)
( 9 )
1973/79
30
(23)
( 7)
1979/80
37
(31)
( 6 )
Major Indirect Taxes
1Customs and Excise
Sales Tax on Domestic Goods
44.5' 
(4*4.5) 
( o- )
40 
(40) 
( 0)
41
(41) 
( 0 )
4 6-
(33.5)
(12.5)
38-
(24;5)
(13.5)
53
(17.5)
(35.9)
51.5
(2 1)
(30.5)
53
(16)
(37)
50
(•15)
(35)
Parastatal Dividends 
Other Sources
0
34.5
• 0 
37.5
1
31.5
3
25.5
3
37.5
2
6
2
10
3
14
3
10
Tbtal 0 100 100
100 100 100 100
100 100
2External Ti*ade Taxes 27 31.5 33 25.5
18 15 25 23 21
Notes: 1.
Sources:
2 .
Includes Sales Tax on-Imports. Excise amalgameted into Sales 
Thx 1977/78 - 1978/19.
Import and Export Duties plus Sales Oflax on Imports.
As For Table 2»
TABLE 4
Analysis of Budgetary Financing Rcquircpent 196:5/64 .- .1979/80
(In Jg)
Ratios To GDP 
Capital Budget
Plus Recurrent Budget Deficit 
or minus Surplus ( )
Budgetary Financing Requirement
External Finance
2Domestic Finance
Grunts/Transfers/etb.
. Non-Bank Borrowing 
Batik Borrowing
Ratios to F inancing Requirement
External Finance 
Bank Borrowing
Rat ios to Capital Budget 
External Finance
196 3/64 1966/67 196 9/70 1972/73 1975/76 1977/78 1976/79 1979/80
2.9 4‘.5 7.8 7.0 12.0 11.0 ' 15.1 15.8
(0.5) (o.o) (0.6) (1.7) (1.1) (1 .9) 4.4 4.9
2.4 4.5 7.2 5.3 10.9 9.9 19.5 20.8
1.0 1.9 1.6 3.3 5.5 4.2 8.0 10.5
\
1:4 2:6 5:6- 2;0 5.4 5:7 11:5 10.3
(1;4) ' (2.6) (0j7) (o. 2 ) (0.5) (0¿5) (0¿4) (0.3)
( - ) ( - ) (2.2) ( n o ) (1.0) (2.5) (1s4) ( U 4 )
( - ) (.- ) (2.7) (0.0) (3.1) (2.0) (9.7) (8.6)
39 43' 22 63 50 42 41 51
- - 30 1 28 19 49 41
33 43 20 47 45 36 54 67
Ro t e s :
1 Includes grants, loans to government. Some small private agency grants nay be misclassified under domostic. Includes 
counterpart Funds from food aid art! balance, of payments support finance in year- paid into Development Revenue account.
2, Excludes domestic counterpart funds from external did (see Note 1).
3. Early year figures appear to include some borrowing eg from Cotton Authority, East African Currency Board. Later years 
include resources from special Funds in year allocated/paid over to Development'Revenue.
Sources: Adopted from "Twenty Year Review" Annex Tables on Public Finance, GDP; Financial Statement and Revenue Estimates 
(various years)
TABLE 5
ELEMENTS OP THE RECURRENT BUDGET AND SOURCES OP GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
1966/67  -  1079/80
(sha* million)
I966/67
1
1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1973/79* 1979/80* j
1* Tax Revenue 1017*2 2937.8 .316 0.6 3302.5 4 6 72.O 5343.0 5854.0 6154.0
2* Other Revenues 6 .8 ' 8 5 .2 781.7 6 16 .0 6 0 7.O 748*1 8 3 0 .0 1116.0
3. Total Recurrent Revenue IO2 4.O 3023.0 3942.3 3918*5 5279.0 6 09 1-1 6684.0 7270.0
4» Recurrent Expenditure 979.7 2 7 8 5 .0 3961.1 3715.6 5108.0 5769.0 8 9 0 7 .0 9094.0
5. Surplus 44.3 238.0 -18.8 202.9 1 7 1 .0 322.1 -2 2 2 3 .0 -1824.0
6. Development Expenditure financed by: 294.4 1 4 4 2 .0 2221.2
2253.0 2731.0 3388.0 4771.0 4800.0
a. Surplus on Recurrent Budget 44.3 238.0 -18.8 209.9 1 7 1 .0 322.1 -2223.0 -1 0 2 4 .0
b. Non—Bank borrowing 59.8 19 6 .0 362.0 336.0 2 76.O 4 8 8 .0 5 6 9 .0 443.0
c. Borrowing from Banks 18 .9 5 2 1 .0 834.0 570.0 - 1 7 0 .5 4 6 4 .0 2 9 1 2 .5 2802.1
d. Other Sources 44.4 6 .0 6.0 113.1 1052.3 744.9 IO8 5.I 778 .9
e. External Loanu and Grants 1 2 7.O 481.0 1038.0 1031.0 1 4 0 2 .0 1 3 6 9 .0 2 4 2 7 .0 2600.0
* Provisional
Source: Economic Survey (Various iasuos) and Budget Documents
TABLE 6
Gross Bank Lending 1966 — 1979*
Central Government (shs. nillion^
of Commercial Non-Government
mi a Banks____ _ Total Borrowing
1966 7 2 .5 93,0 170.5 8O Ó .5
1968 6 4 .9 8 0 .1 145-0 8 1 9 .8
1969 75.ó 168.3 . 243.9 964.1
1970 2 9 1 .3 16 4 .7 y 456*0 1141.3
1973 484.9 558.6 1043*5 1 56 6 .9
1974 863*3 671.2 1534.5 2456.4
1976 1477.2 1895.1 3372.3 3513*6
1977 1445.6 1873*7 3324.3 3847.7
1978 2041.3 1898 .2 3939.5 5153.1
1979 4515.6 2589.3 7104.9 6418,2
* The fijares are given in quarterly averages
Source: Bank of Tanzania* Economic and Operations Report /vari.cus years)
